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Abstract 
 
Background: Medication errors pose a significant 
problem in the clinical environment, causing adverse 
events which impact patient safety. 
Problem: The introduction of electronic 
information and clinical systems have reduced 
medication errors but have also been identified as 
creating new types of errors.  
Method: Using the previously developed Hermon 
model, this research aimed to identify and understand 
medication errors due to clinical information-flow in 
the Australian General Practice (primary care) setting. 
The research used existing general practice medication 
error report cases from the Threat to Patient Safety 
(TAPS) Study to map against the Hermon model, and 
validated this mapping through consultations with 
general practitioners. 
Findings: The findings informed the refinement of 
the Hermon Model, and assisted in identifying 
medication errors points of information-flow failure in 
general practice information-flow.  
Impact: This study has significance to improve 
patient safety and inform the development of general 
practice desktop systems through identification and 
understanding of information-flow points of failure 
which result in medication errors.  
Keywords: Information-Flow, Information-flow 
Mapping, Medication Errors, GP Desktop Systems, 
Threat to Patient Safety (TAPS) Study, Hermon Model 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Medication errors can cause patient harm and even 
death. Given medication errors are preventable, it is 
important to understand and identify them within the 
medication management information-flow process. 
Through identifying and understanding the point of 
failure for information-flow that result in medication 
errors, it is possible to implement interventions. This 
research investigated medication errors due to 
information-flow in the Australian General Practice 
setting, with particular reference to the use of general 
practice (GP) desktop systems. Through an 
information-flow framework called the Hermon model, 
164 Threat to Patient Safety (TAPS) cases were 
mapped to identify medication errors failure points. 
This enabled the Hermon model to be refined to 
understand medication errors with reference to GP 
information-flow and desktop systems. Subsequently, 
the model underwent an initial validation using 
consultation with two expect medical practitioners. 
This paper discusses the background and justification 
of the research, the method, the Hermon model and the 
findings from the case study and interview research. 
 
2. Background  
 
What are medication errors?  
 
For the purpose of this research, medication errors 
have been defined as “an act by a health care 
professional/ patient that has resulted in a preventable 
mistake regarding medications that can occur 
throughout the various stages of the clinical process” 
[7]. There are several types of medication errors, such 
as wrong dose, wrong type of medication, missed dose, 
incorrect patient information and missed medication 
allergy information [7]. Further, medication errors can 
occur at defined stages of the patient journey, 
described as administration, diagnosis, treatment and 
discharge [7]. Having discussed the types of 
medication errors that occur, it is important to discuss 
the causes of these medication errors.  
 
What causes medication errors? 
 
Traditionally, it has been argued that medication 
errors result from human errors of many types [5, 12]. 
Medication errors are often a result of errors of 
omission and commission by staff or even patients. 
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Medication errors can be caused by either lack of 
knowledge, failure to follow a rule, failure in action 
such as a slip or failure to recall such as a lapse in 
memory [5]. According to [2] approximately 33% of 
medication errors reported were due to failure to 
follow policy and procedure or misinterpretation of 
prescribing information. According to [12] many 
computer systems may not maintain updated and 
correct patient medication allergies, resulting in 
incorrect or potentially harmful prescription 
medications. Moreover, it is evident that simple human 
mistakes can be caused by tired, emotional or stressed 
staff, which can result in medication errors that can 
have potentially devastating consequences [12]. 
Historically, messy handwriting has been an immense 
factor in the interpretation of diagnosis and 
prescriptions [12] as staff ranging from nurses to 
doctors can misinterpret a diagnosis or prescription that 
has been written. Often medications can sound or look 
similar and confusion can occur, which results in the 
wrong medication being prescribed. A large number of 
patients may pressure physicians to quickly diagnose 
them, and as a result, a patient may receive a vague 
diagnosis in an aim to be discharged quickly, which 
can increase the likelihood of a medication error [18]. 
Additionally, failure to communicate information 
concerning patient welfare can occur between nurses 
and doctors, while incorrect staff training, and patient 
ignorance can also pose a problem. From these errors, 
it can be seen that medication errors occur within 
information-flow. This is further supported by [1] who 
suggested the failure to communicate effectively and 
efficiently in a timely manner will result in the highly 
probable occurrence of medication related errors. 
 
The consequences of medication errors  
 
The consequences of medication errors can have a 
costly impact to both patients and the healthcare 
system. For example, [16] estimated that medication 
errors incur a global cost of $40 billion dollars 
annually. While in Australia alone the cost of 
medication errors are $1.4 billion dollars [11]. Not only 
do medication errors incur a financial cost but also an 
impact to patient safety. More specifically [13, 14, 15] 
calculated 2% to 3% of all hospital admissions were 
medication error related, while [16] further calculate 
7,000 to 9,000 patients die in the United States as a 
consequence of medication errors. Importantly, 
medication errors are preventable [12], and through 
information-flow can be further understood.   
 
Healthcare Information-flow  
 
Information-flow comes from the theory of 
information and describes how a piece of information 
travels from one place to another and its path of 
transmission [3]. An example of basic information-flow 
involves understanding how information travels from 
its original location to its intended recipient. 
Information-flow requires the “logic of distributed 
systems” [11, p. 177], which are systems that contain 
separate parts. Importantly, information systems, and 
in particular health data systems, are categorised as 
distributed systems. Health data systems alternatively 
named health information systems have been defined 
as “an arrangement of information (data), processes, 
people, and information technology that interact to 
collect, process, store and provide as output the 
information needed to support the health care 
organization [sic]” [17, p. 105]. Further, GP desktop 
systems in particular contribute to health data systems. 
The next section of this paper will discuss GP desktop 
systems and the relationship to medication errors.  
 
GP Desktop Systems and medication errors  
 
According to [6, 10] 95% of General Practitioners in 
Australia utilise GP desktop systems. Therefore, GP 
desktop systems play an important role in General 
Practice, as patient information is collected and stored 
in these specific health data systems. Building on from 
the idea that medication errors occur because of human 
errors; General Practice medication errors are also 
noted to be a common yet preventable problem. For 
example, a study conducted by [9] involved the 
BEACH (Bettering the Evaluation and Care of Health) 
data collection program. The results indicated that out 
of 8215 encounters, GPs reported that 852 patients 
(10.4%) had experienced adverse drug events, which 
were caused by a medication error in the previous 6 
months. The findings by [9] suggested that 23.2% of 
the events that were reported by GP’s were 
preventable. Having discussed medication errors and 
GP desktop systems within health information systems, 
it is now necessary to discuss the role of the clinical 
information-flow framework in identifying and 
understanding medication errors.  
 
3. Clinical information-flow framework 
(Hermon Model) 
 
Previous research by [7] devised a framework that 
identified information-flow interruption that results in 
medication errors. Highlighted in Figure 1 is the 
Hermon Model, which was created to represent the 
possibility of miscommunication occurring at any stage 
of the clinical information process. Highlighted in 
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Figure 1, the Hermon model depicts the outcome, 
event and original error that caused the medication 
error. It should be noted that the process definition of 
information-flow errors did not include other errors in 
the clinical process that may have occurred. The 
Hermon Model represents information-flow failure in 
the clinical process to demonstrate and identify the 
point in the process where errors occur and how this 
relates to communication.  
 
Figure 1. The original Hermon Model developed to 
understand medication errors [7] 
This research focussed on how the generalised 
Hermon model could be used to analyse GP reported 
medication information-flow incidents. 
 
4. Method  
 
The aim of the project was to conduct an 
investigation into the prevention of medication errors 
due to information-flow within the general practice 
environment. To achieve this objective the following 
steps in research were taken: 
 
1. Determine whether the previously devised 
Hermon Model could be used to identify 
general practice medication errors due to 
information-flow failure. 
2. Identify information-flow failure in GP 
desktop systems. 
3. Recommend possible solutions and future 
research that would apply the clinical 
information-flow model. 
 
This research looked at information-flow and points 
of information-flow failure, as such information 
systems theory research was the methodology of this 
research project. However, case study and interview 
methods were deployed to answer the following 
research question. 
 
Research Question:  
 
How can the Hermon Model be used to identify and 
understand medication errors due to clinical 
information-flow in Australian General Practice? 
 
 
Case Study:  
 
The case study aimed to build on the existing 
clinical information-flow (Hermon) model through 
mapping of known cases to the Hermon Model. The 
mapping of the cases was initially completed by the 
primary researcher and then confirmed by expert 
researchers in the group. The mapping of cases was 
required to validate the Hermon model and identify the 
points in which medication errors occur in information-
flow. The Threat to Patient Safety (TAPS) Study [8] 
which had been previously conducted by Meredith 
Makeham, determined the rate of errors reported by 
GPs in the State of New South Wales, Australia 
through anonymous reporting of errors using a secure 
web-based questionnaire. The TAPS study, resulted in 
418 error reports by General Practitioners. Medication 
error cases were set as the inclusion criteria and 
resulted in the identification of 164 TAPS case studies 
that could be mapped against the Hermon model. As 
shown in Table 1 the case studies were categorized into 
the four categories that comprise the clinical process 
(Admin, Diagnosis, Treatment and Post 
Treatment/Follow-Up) in order to evaluate the type and 
number of errors mapped. The categories of the clinical 
process are defined below: 
 
Admin: Administration involves, but is not limited 
to, administration work, medication history/ patient 
history, clinical records and documentation, results, 
computer systems.  
Diagnosis: The category diagnosis is distinguished 
by events in which patients are diagnosed. 
Treatment: This category refers to decision 
support provided by GP desktop systems. 
 Post Treatment/Follow Up: this category refers 
to events which occur after the patient has been 
diagnosed and treated. Most often, this refers to events 
in which the patient is at home.   
 
5. Results 
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As can be seen from Table 1, 19/164 cases were 
errors that started in Admin, 3/164 started in diagnosis, 
132/164 started in Treatment and 10/164 started in the 
Post Treatment/Follow Up category. The results in 
Table 1 show that the majority of errors involve the 
Treatment category which ranges from prescribing 
medications to dispensing.  
 
 
Table 1. Where TAPS cases fit within the clinical 
process points. 
 
 
Table 2 identifies the course of the error. What 
stands out in the table is that 91 errors were initiated by 
the GP. Additionally, 29 cases were found to be the 
result of a pharmaceutical error, clinicians were to have 
caused 13 errors, while hospital staff had caused 9 
errors, and nursing home staff were responsible for 6 
error cases. It should be noted that further analysis of 
error cases reveal that several factors can contribute to 
a medication error and many individuals or factors may 
be responsible at the time of the error. 
 
Table 2. Source of error 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 provides the reasons for the medication error 
and Table 4 identifies the type of medication error.3 
 
Table 3. What was the error? 
 
Table 4 demonstrates that miscommunication was 
the reason for errors at 16 cases. While errors during 
the process of prescribing and dispensing medication 
resulted in 71 error cases. Uniformed or misinformed 
GPs were also a factor in 16 cases. Other reasons 
included misfiled notes, failure to follow up, recall, 
wrong diagnosis or wrong patient. Classification of the 
various causes of errors show that communication 
between GPs and patients resulted in 5 error cases. 
Medication errors that held the highest errors involve 
the areas of wrong medication dosage (18 cases) and 
medication management (19 cases).  
 
Table 4. Types of medication errors 
 
Table 5 shows the number of cases which clearly 
identified human error rather than an information-flow 
failure. Human error refers to simple human mistakes 
such as slips/lapse. Lapse refers to a lapse in memory 
while slips referring to a mistake. 
 
 
Table 5. Human error 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision Support from software was placed in a 
separate category and each case study that involved a 
computer desktop error was recorded. Table 6 shows 
that 41 cases were due to computer error. Poor 
Clinical Process Points  Total Case Studies 
Admin 19 
Diagnosis 3 
Treatment 132 
Post Treatment 
Total 
10  
164 
Who caused the error  Total Case Studies 
GP 91 
Pharmacist 29 
Locum 1 
Specialist 
RMO 
Clinician 
Hospital 
Radiology 
Nursing Home 
Nurse 
Pharmaceutical company 
Reception 
Patient 
Total 
2 
1 
13 
9 
1 
6 
2 
1 
3 
5 
164 
Reason  Total Case Studies 
Communication Failure 16 
Malpractice 2 
Medication error 71 
Misfiled Notes 
Failure to follow up 
Recall 
Misinformed/ uniformed GP 
Wrong Diagnosis 
Wrong Patient 
 
1 
4 
1 
16 
1 
1 
 
Medication error type  Total Case Studies 
Wrong medication dosage 18 
Wrong medication type 11 
Wrong dosage instructions 1 
Wrong medication dispensed 
Wrong medication on prescription 
Medication mismanagement  
No medication dispensed  
Total 
9 
11 
19 
2 
71 
  
Reason  Total Case Studies 
Human error 26 
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discharge summaries (2 cases), incorrect computer 
prescriptions (12 cases), wrong patient files (16 cases) 
and not reviewing computer notes (3 cases) were some 
of the error causes recorded. Lack of computer alarms 
(5 cases) was also noted within the cases mapped and 
other factors such as confusion of software (2 cases) 
and juxtaposition errors (1 case) were evident.  
 
Table 6. GP desktop system errors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 indicates the number of indeterminable 
case studies. These two cases contained too little 
medication error information to classify or map against 
the Hermon model.   
 
Table 7. Indeterminable cases 
 
Although each case study was categorised into the 
clinical process points, further analysis of the mapped 
case studies showed that many of the case studies fit 
into entirely different categories. The following tables 
were created to manage the exceptions and categorise 
the case studies that did not fit into the four clinical 
process points as shown in Table 8.  
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Exceptions 
 
Highlighted in Table 8 a total of 15/164 exceptions 
were identified within the case studies that were 
mapped against the Hermon Model. These exceptions 
refer to case studies which do not necessarily fit the 
predetermined 4 categories of clinical process points. 
They refer events in which a near miss occurred 
resulting in no adverse event (6/15). Exceptions (1/5) 
also refer to patient non-compliance in which the 
patient purposely does not follow instructions given by 
the GP and therefore resulted in a medication error. 
Exceptions and interminable cases form part of the 
limitations of the case studies used as they may contain 
vague information regarding errors. This section 
analysed the findings of the mapped TAPS cases 
against the Hermon model. The next section will 
discuss how the model was validated through the 
mapping of case studies.  
 
TAPS Mapping Analysis 
 
The Hermon model was initially designed to 
identify and understand the points in the information-
flow process where medication errors occur. The result 
of mapping 164 case studies against the Hermon model 
resulted in validation of the Hermon model for 
application to the GP environment. This is because the 
Hermon model could identify the various points of the 
medication error within information-flow. However, 
various improvements to the model were required to 
better define its validity and ability to map medication 
errors within a GP setting. Firstly, from the mapped 
case data it is shown that the majority of errors 
occurred in treatment. This indicates that treatment 
errors such as wrong prescription, wrong dosage and 
wrong medications are just some of the many 
medication errors that are of common occurrence. A 
significant finding was that medication errors occur 
across each clinical process point of the Hermon 
Model. Therefore, an important aspect of redefining 
the Hermon model is to indicate what type of treatment 
error had occurred, and whether or not it involved 
medication management. This was suggested by the 
researchers as a refinement of the Hermon model as a 
result of the mapping of the cases that showed that 
some errors do not involve medication management. 
However, it has been recognised that the exceptions 
(Table 8) are often related to information-flow failure 
and are therefore required to be mapped against the 
Hermon Model in order to understand information-
flow failure. Secondly, within the mapped case studies, 
computer systems medical records have been placed in 
the Admin category. However, it was noticed that 
errors involving GP desktop systems can start in any of 
the clinical process points. Therefore, if computer 
GP desktop system  Total Case Studies 
Incorrect discharge summary 2 
Incorrect dosage selected 6 
Wrong dosage instruction 
written 
2 
Wrong medication selected 
Wrong patient file selected 
GP did not review patient 
notes 
GP did not remove old 
medications 
Juxtaposition error 
Lack of alarms 
Nurse 
Confusion of software use 
Total 
4 
15 
3 
1 
1 
2 
1 
5 
5 
2 
41 
Indeterminable  Total Case Studies 
Indeterminable  2 
  
 Exceptions  Total Case Studies 
Patient non-compliance 9 
Near Miss 6 
Total 15 
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system records stay within the category of Admin, it 
will limit the validity of the Hermon model. In 
addition, the Admin clinical process point has been 
seen to be too vague and could potentially result in 
confusion between the role of admin and patient 
medication information. Therefore, the Admin 
category needed to be well defined, and differentiation 
between computer systems and administration needed 
to be categorized. Thirdly, analysis of results indicated 
that GPs, clinicians and pharmacists are the main cause 
of errors. Therefore, the model needed to be redesigned 
to suit the General Practice environment with regards 
to this research. Lastly, changes to the model were 
necessary in order for the model to be better 
understood by clinicians.   
From the mapping of the case studies against the 
Hermon model it is evident that the majority of 
medications errors are caused by information-flow 
failure and human error. Miscommunication, 
uniformed/misinformed GPs and the errors within the 
clinical desktop systems are just some of the many 
issues that occur within information flow. A category 
regarding Software needed to be incorporated within 
the model, as 22% of errors were associated with GP 
desktop systems. Human errors were often due to a 
lapse in memory or an accidently slip. Further, from 
the case studies many reported lack of computer alerts 
was a factor in the occurrence of the medication error. 
This indicates the important potential alarm 
intervention and whether or not the Hermon model 
should include alarms and interventions. Additionally, 
communication between GPs and patients as well as 
other entities such as pharmacies and hospitals are of 
great significance. In particular, communication failure 
between individuals was a cause of medication errors, 
whilst appropriate communication and double checking 
of medications resulted in interventions. Subsequently, 
the importance of reporting medication errors within 
the GP has been highlighted through the TAPS case 
study. Through mapping against the Hermon model, 
identification and understanding of identifying 
medication errors failure points within GP information-
flow have occurred.  
 
Interviews 
The interviews aimed to validate the revised 
Hermon model through feedback with two general 
practitioners. During this stage of the research, the 
clinicians were consulted to validate the Hermon 
model with regards to information-flow and 
information system use. The interviewer asked the 
clinicians several questions after they assessed the 
clinical information-flow model against mapped TAPS 
case studies. Questions regarding the effectiveness of 
the model to accurately reflect their medication 
management process were asked.  
Questions were informed by the case mapping but 
included some of the following general questions: 
1. Does the model effectively map out clinical 
errors? 
2. Does the model identify where the error 
occurred? Who it affected, how it occurred and 
what were the consequences? 
3. Can this model be used in a variety of clinical 
settings? 
4. Does the model reflect the use of their GP 
desktop system in terms of the processes used 
in medication management? 
5. Does the model require improvements?  
6. Identify where the GP desktop system used 
impacts medication errors, as identified in the 
Hermon model. 
 
Analysis of interviews:  
The answers of the clinicians were analysed to 
validate the model for General Practice and identify 
potential points of information-flow failure related to 
GP desktop systems. A significant finding of the 
research was that the prescribing of medication occurs 
directly through General Practice software application  
and utilises medication data bases which; potentially 
reduce the likelihood of medication spelling error, 
assist GPs on information regarding medication 
dosages and allows GPs to make certain default 
changes to patient medications, which can prevent 
medication recall errors. To explain, a recall error 
occurs when a General Practitioner has a lapse in 
memory regarding the details of prescribing a patient 
medication. Additionally, GP desktop systems also 
identify medication allergies within patients and 
illuminate possible diagnosis which is coded as 
dangerous medications or interactions. Interestingly, 
based on the interview results, issues identified with 
GP software systems refer to lack of medication 
dosage warnings, alarm fatigue and that allergies of 
patients must be entered prior prescription of 
medication. Nonetheless, GP desktop systems overall 
are a huge benefit and aid General Practitioners in 
storing large columns of patient information which can 
be easily recalled when needed.  Concerns were 
expressed about the Hermon models lack of 
intuitiveness and understandability. Opinions agreed 
that the Hermon model required the Admin category to 
be more clearly defined, and that the clinical process 
must be clearly shown. While the categories of admin, 
diagnosis, and treatment and post treatment needed to 
be evaluated to fit as points in the clinical process. 
Through the consultations it has been decided that the 
Hermon model can potentially assist in understanding 
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the points of failure in information-flow that may result 
in medication errors. It is also understood that the 
model captures GP desktop systems in terms of 
processes used in medication management. Another 
reported theme was in regards to the computer error 
reports raised by GPs. In order to map medication 
errors against the Hermon framework, the GP is 
required to raise an in-depth medication error report. 
However, a common view held was that GPs are not 
necessarily consistent with information reported within 
a medication error report. To expand, mapping 
medication errors from inconsistent and insufficient 
reporting would result in incomplete and possibly 
inaccurate identification of process points.        
One interviewee suggested the inclusion of a fourth 
column that contains what could be changed to avoid 
future error, and that diagnosis should be placed within 
a separate column. While treatment should show drug 
interactions and post treatment should show allergies 
and inappropriate medication treatments. Additionally, 
it was suggested that the reason for error, drug 
interactions, allergies, dosage, and inappropriate 
medications for diagnosis should have a separate 
column in order to understand the process of 
medications errors. In addition, the human 
error/computer error category should be removed as 
most prescriptions are written in a GP desktop system 
and are caused by human errors. Overall, these results 
indicate that the Hermon model needs to be redesigned 
for GP practice user application.  
 
6. Findings 
The objective of the research was to conduct an 
investigation into the prevention of medication errors 
due to information-flow within the general practice 
environment. Therefore, using a case study method, the 
Threat to Patient Safety (TAPS) was mapped to the 
Hermon model in order to map medication errors in the 
GP environment. One unanticipated finding was that 
the data gathered revealed that there was a relationship 
to human error and the General Practitioner, which 
often resulted in a snowball effect. The snowball effect 
relates to errors which further continue to make other 
errors which then grow to cause harm to patient safety. 
Further, the case study mapping suggested that a 
General Practitioner is likely to make a mistake using 
the computer desktop systems during the treatment 
stage when prescribing a medication to a patient as 
evident with 41 errors relating to GP desktop systems. 
As identified by the snowball effect, this error will then 
go on to produce further errors such as wrong 
prescription. For example, 31 out of 71 cases resulted 
in wrong prescription medication and 23 out of the 71 
resulted in wrong medication type. Another important 
finding was that in the event of an intervention such as 
an alert, a near miss would result. To illustrate, 6 cases 
out of 164 cases mapped were a near miss. As 
mentioned in the literature review medication errors 
can be caused by a variety of factors and can start at 
any stage of the clinical process because of human 
error. This was further supported by the findings of the 
case study information-flow medication error mapping.  
 
From the consultation interviews the Hermon 
model was redeveloped into Figure 2 which could be 
applied to the different aspects of the General 
Practitioner environment. Redesigning of the Hermon 
model produced Figure 2 which had a GP prescription 
medication error approach that focused on medication 
and adverse event alerts. Additionally, future 
interventions and solutions were also included as an 
outcome of the interviews. An outcome of this study 
was that the model had the ability to map out 
medication errors which would result in the 
identification and understanding of these errors. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Hermon Model redesigned from TAPS 
mapping and Interviews. 
 
7. Discussion  
 
Medication errors pose a significant problem in the 
clinical environment, causing adverse events which 
may include side effects, such as death or disability. 
Such errors are costly, with an annual expenditure of 
$350 million dollars being spent on medication error 
related admissions. Information and clinical systems 
have been identified as one area contributing to 
medication errors both in terms of the use of IT as well 
as from traditional information and communication 
flow processes. Computer and human errors can cause 
a disruption to the process of information-flow and can 
result in incorrect drug dosage and other types of 
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medication errors. Previous research has been able to 
identify the points in the clinical information-flow 
process where medication errors, related to information 
processing have occurred. These points can be 
generally categorised as Administration, Diagnosis, 
Treatment and Post Treatment. Using the previously 
developed Hermon model, this research aimed to 
identify and understand medication errors due to 
clinical information-flow in an Australian General 
Practice setting. The research used existing General 
Practice medication error report cases from the Threat 
to Patient Safety (TAPS) Study to map against the 
Hermon model, and validated this mapping through 
consultations with General Practitioners. The findings 
have resulted in the further refinement of the Hermon 
Model, and assisted in the identification of how 
medication errors occur within the GP desktop 
systems. The significance of this research is to improve 
patient safety, to inform the development of GP 
desktop systems. Through this identification of factors, 
prevention and possible solutions can be developed to 
prevent medication errors and improve patient safety.         
 
 
8. Conclusion  
 
This study set out to identify, and understand, 
information-flow related medication errors within GP 
settings. Therefore, the research question: How can the 
Hermon model be used to identify and understand 
medication errors due to clinical information flow 
failure, originating in Australian General Practice? was 
posed. Through Case Study analysis and interviews 
with practitioners the Hermon model was validated and 
refined. Importantly, this framework was identified to 
have the capacity to map medication errors within 
General Practice, which can ultimately allow an 
improved understanding of medication errors. Whilst 
this is one clinical example, using a General Practice 
setting, the model could potentially be used in 
medication error and incident reporting analysis in 
other healthcare environments. The main outcome of 
this research was demonstration of the medication 
mapping to the Hermon model and to inform its 
refinement. This demonstrated its ability to assist in 
understanding and identifying the points of 
information-flow failure which can result in 
medication errors. This is important to understand and 
potentially prevent medication errors associated with 
the use of GP desktop systems. This research 
contributes to ongoing research into the safety of 
health software by identifying points of information-
flow failure in medication management processes. The 
research is unique and has contributed to knowledge 
because the mapping of medication errors information-
flow has not been undertaken previously.  
 
9. Limitations of Research method chosen 
 
Using cases 
Interpretation of analysis may be bias or incorrect. In 
addition, the amount of case studies must be until 
saturation is evident. Saturation was used to develop 
enough information to present evidence regarding the 
Hermon Model. Time constraints are evident, as the 
analysis of the case studies were time consuming. 
Additionally, the TAPS cases were conducted prior to 
2006, in which there have been several changes to IT.   
Interviews 
The participants were appropriately chosen as 
clinicians who were knowledgeable in e-health and 
medication errors. Cross checking occurred to prevent 
personal bias of the Hermon Model. The interview 
questions were reviewed to assess their relation to the 
research question, in order to obtain the objectives of 
the study. During the interview too broad or too narrow 
questions could have resulted in bias of results [4]. 
Additionally, a limitation of the interviews was the 
small validation group (2 GPs).  
 
9. Ethical considerations 
Various ethical issues were considered during data 
collection and analysis. Factors such as informed 
consent, confidentiality and the risks associated with 
the study were regarded. Individuals participating in 
interviews were required to be informed of the study 
and written consent obtained [4], resulting in the 
approval of ethics for use of the TAPS cases and 
interviews. Whilst patient information was not being 
sought, the researcher was careful to protect the 
confidentiality of any information advertently provided 
during the consultations of both participants.  
 
10. Future research  
The next stage of this research would be to further 
investigate the application of the Hermon model to 
health information-flow and health systems, in order to 
identify the aspects that could be addressed in 
software, and those that could be addressed through 
education and human interaction.  
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